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Audit Market Structure , Fees and Choice following the 
Andersen Break-up:  Evidence from the UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and auditor fee levels in 
the UK market in the crucial period of structural change following the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) merger and encompassing Andersen’s demise (1998-
2003).  Given the current interest in auditor choice, analysis is also undertaken at the 
individual audit firm level and by industry sector.  There is evidence of significant 
upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 but only for smaller auditees.  Audit fee 
income for top tier auditors (Big 5/4) did not change significantly while the number of 
auditees fell significantly, consistent with a move towards larger, less risky, clients.  
Andersen’s demise markedly reduced the level of inequality among the top tier firms 
but PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’. On switching to the new auditor, 
former Andersen clients experienced audit fee rises broadly in line with inflation, with 
no evidence of fee premia or discounting.  They also reported significantly lower 
NAS fees, consistent with audit firms and auditees responding to public concerns 
about perceptions of auditor independence.  There is no general evidence of 
knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit fee by NAS.  The 
combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes have 
resulted in anticompetitive pricing; the key concern remains the lack of audit firm 
choice.  
 
Key words: Arthur Andersen; audit market; audit fees; concentration; Big 4; industry 
specialism; competition; low-balling. 
 
Audit Market Structure , Fees and Choice following the 
Andersen Break-up:  Evidence from the UK 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rising audit market concentration has attracted the interest of regulators, market 
participants and academics for many years, especially since the audit firm mega-
mergers of the 1980s and 1990s which reduced the global Big 8 to the Big 5.  During 
that period, there was a general concern (based on the predictions of classical micro-
economic theory) that excessive concentration would reduce competition, leading to 
an increase in the price of the services provided by the auditor (Financial Times, 
1997).  Paradoxically, there was also concern, based on observed market behaviour, 
regarding excessive competition and low-balling (e.g. CAJEC, 1992).  From an 
industrial economics viewpoint, high seller concentration can both harm consumers 
and also benefit them through, for example, economies of scale and scope.  Although 
concerns about the so-called ‘mega-mergers’ on competition were raised, in general 
the regulatory conclusion was that the mergers would be unlikely to substantially 
lessen competition (Goddard, 1998; Thavapalan et al., 2002).   
A further major shock to the system of financial reporting and auditing arose when the 
US energy giant, Enron, failed in 2001.  This event, along with other financial 
scandals in the US, led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which 
instituted reforms designed to restore confidence in corporate governance.  Given the 
global nature of capital markets and further scandals in Europe (e.g. Parmalat), there 
have been moves to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley style reforms throughout Europe and 
elsewhere (Oxley, 2007; Quick et al., 2007).  In June 2002, Andersen, one of the top 
five audit firms in the world, was convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding 
documents related to Enron.1 As a result, the firm lost its auditing license in the US.2  
In August 2002, the firm ceased business and, in the UK, was acquired by Deloitte & 
Touche, reducing the number of big accounting firms from five to four. In the US, the 
Andersen business was dissolved and former Andersen clients switched to other, 
mainly Big 4, audit firms. This event sparked further intense debate, which is 
ongoing, about competition and audit quality in the audit market (e.g., EC, 2002; 
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OFT, 2002; GAO, 2003; Oxera, 2006; FRC, 2006a, b, c; FRC 2007a, b; FRC 2008; 
US Treasury, 2007) and provides motivation for the present study. 
 
In the US, the General Accounting Office (GAO) studied the effect of consolidation 
but found no evidence of impaired competition (GAO, 2003).  Prior to Andersen’s 
acquisition, the EC also examined the possible impact of the acquisition, concluding 
that there was no danger of the creation of a single dominant firm since Andersen and 
Deloitte were the smallest of the Big 5 firms (EC, 2002).  More recently, the US 
Treasury (2007) announced the formation of an Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession, which is due to report in mid-2008.  One of the principal topics to be 
considered by the committee is audit market competition and concentration.  The 
specific issues to be considered include, inter alia, a comparison of ‘the capabilities of 
the different sizes of auditing firms with the requirements of the large, mid, and small 
capitalization public companies’ (para. 4.1.3.5.2) and how audit market concentration 
impacts audit quality (para. 4.1.4).    
 
In the UK, a report on competition and choice in the UK audit market was 
commissioned by the UK Department of Trade and Industry/Financial Reporting 
Council (Oxera, 2006).3  This was followed by discussion papers on choice in the UK 
audit market and promoting audit quality (FRC, 2006a, b; 2007c) and by reports on 
choice (FRC, 2007a, b).  Stakeholders expressed a strong preference for market-led 
solutions to the problem of restricted choice in the market for audit services to public 
interest entities in the UK and proposed a package of 15 recommendations designed to 
lessen concentration over the medium term.  These recommendations require action 
by all market participants including audit firms, investors, companies, regulators and 
legislators.4   
Academics have also investigated the impact of Andersen’s dissolution on 
concentration, with Beattie et al. (2003) predicting that the acquisition would increase 
the Big 4’s UK listed clientele to 72.8% of all audit clients (96.3% in terms of audit 
fees).  In terms of individual firm market share, it was projected that Deloitte would 
become the third largest audit firm in the UK, accounting for 19.2 % of the total 
market (based on audit fees).  
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However, as the EC and Beattie et al. (2003) studies were based on pro-forma figures, 
there is no published study that documents the actual impact of Andersen’s 
dissolution in the UK. Further, since these studies cover only a very short period of 
time, the extent of change in concentration in the UK listed company audit market in 
recent years is not yet fully documented.  This is especially true for the period 
following the Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merger in 1998.  To our 
knowledge, the only UK study that offers a detailed investigation of audit market 
concentration among the entire population of listed companies during the 2000s is 
Beattie et al. (2003).  Previously, studies undertaken by Briston and Kedslie (1985), 
Moizer and Turley (1987, 1989), Beattie and Fearnley (1994), Peel (1997),5 and Pong 
(1999) jointly cover the period from 1972 to 1995.6  The study by Pong and Burnett 
(2006) examines the years 1997 and 2001.  Figures reported in recent studies 
commissioned or produced by regulators (Oxera, 2006; POB, 2006, 2007; FRC, 
2007b) offer limited insights into the structure of the market, due to restricted samples 
or the use of measures based on only number of audits.  Recent academic studies are 
also based on restricted samples: McMeeking (2007) reports on the FRSE 100 while 
McMeeking et al. (2007) report on 309 listed companies in 2002. 
The present study seeks to provide answers to the following specific questions with 
respect to the UK domestic listed company audit market during the crucial period of 
structural change 1998-2003: 
General issues 
• What was the level of audit market concentration following the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ merger and Andersen’s demise (i.e., 1998 to 2003) 
and has it changed significantly? 
• Are the larger mid-tier firms in a position to compete in the listed company 
market? 
• Have audit fee rates changed significantly during the period? 
• What is the relative importance of joiners, leavers and switchers in explaining 
the overall change in audit market concentration?  
Andersen-related issues 
• How did the Andersen demise affect market concentration? 
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• Following Andersen’s demise, who now dominates the market at industry 
level? 
• Who audits former Andersen clients and did their audit and/or non-audit 
services (NAS) fees change significantly? 
 
The specific contributions of the paper are fourfold.  First, it provides a discussion of 
both the traditional and contemporary theory of industrial economics and its 
limitations in relation to making predictions about real markets (and the audit market 
in particular.)  Second, it presents a descriptive analysis of the structure of the entire 
population of the listed company market (where existing studies cover only restricted 
samples) and at a detailed level (industry sector and individual firm) for a crucial 
period of structural change.  Third, it offers insights into the complex dynamics 
underlying observed changes in market structure by undertaking a decomposition 
analysis.  Fourth, it contributes to the growing, and conflicting, Andersen-related 
literature by (i) analysing the impact of this event in the UK, where no study has yet 
been published; (ii) documenting the impact on market structure; (iii) analysing the 
fee impact of the Andersen dissolution, controlling for company size; and (iv) 
evaluating the possible impact of NAS fee cross-subsidisation on audit fees. 
 
Due to the global nature of many large companies, the capital markets and the audit 
firm networks, the characteristics of the UK listed company audit market are shared 
with many other markets worldwide (FRC, 2006a: 8).  Thus, the findings and 
conclusions from the present study have potential relevance in the global setting.  
Notwithstanding this, however, national markets do have specific characteristics and 
features.  For example, the manner of the Andersen dissolution varied across countries 
– in the UK most clients transferred to Deloitte & Touche, in Australia most 
transferred to Ernst and Young and in the US the spread was fairly wide. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  The next section provides a brief 
overview of the economic theory on market structure and behaviour, before 
considering the unique features of the audit market setting and discussing the factors 
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that lead to changes in market concentration.  This literature section goes on to review 
prior empirical studies of audit market concentration, the consequences of market 
concentration and the impact of Andersen’s demise on audit pricing.  Section 3 
outlines the methods used to measure audit market concentration, data sources and 
data collection methods.  Section 4 presents the results and discussion.  Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
2.1 Industrial economics: traditional and contemporary theory 
From the 1940s until the 1970s, the study of industrial organisation has centred on the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm.  This theory posits that there is a 
direct link from structure, to conduct, to performance.  The implication is that the 
more concentrated an industry, the more market power7 the organisation exercises and 
thus the larger the deviation from competitive pricing.  This view resulted in 
aggressive antitrust policy in the US and Europe (Pepall et al., 2008). 
Over time, the strict one-way causality assumed by the SCP view was called into 
question.  It was realised that increased concentration, when combined with cost 
efficiencies, does not necessarily lead to higher prices.  In equilibrium, both 
concentration and performance are endogenously determined by underlying cost and 
demand parameters (Beattie et al., 2003).  Thus, more efficient firms should grow 
faster than less efficient firms resulting in a more concentrated industry structure.  
This offers a more benign explanation of the observation that larger market shares go 
hand in hand with greater profitability. 
In the 1970s, researchers at the Chicago School began to consider the importance of 
strategic interactions among interdependent firms in conditions of imperfect 
competition and the ability of firms to enter the market.  The focus shifted from the 
study of market structure (S) and performance (P) to the study of conduct (C) (i.e., 
strategic behaviour).  It was gradually realised that the decisions made by firms 
regarding pricing, nature of product/service, expansion and investment feed back to 
affect structure.  Strategic interaction was modelled using (non-cooperative) game 
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theory, giving rise to the ‘new industrial organisation’ theory of the 1980s and which 
continues to the present.  The Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg models (each with 
its different assumptions) have become central to the study of oligopoly (Pepall et al., 
2008).   
Industrial economists have suggested that a tight oligopoly prevails where the market 
share of the top four firms exceeds 60%, with a loose oligopoly for below 40% market 
share (Shepherd, 1997).  A tight oligopoly has fewer rivals, higher concentration, 
stable market shares and medium to high barriers to entry, whereas a loose oligopoly 
has more rivals, lower concentration, unstable market shares and low barriers to entry.  
Collusion is considered more likely in tight oligopolies.  
The PricewaterhouseCoopers merger and the Andersen demise represent de jure and 
de facto horizontal mergers, respectively.  Such mergers offer an obvious threat to 
competition.  Yet it is difficult to construct an economic model in which there are 
significant gains to the merged company due to cost efficiencies – this is the ‘merger 
paradox’.  As a consequence of these theoretical ambiguities, competition regulation 
must also rely on empirical analysis to predict ex ante and observe ex post the effects 
of changes in market structure (Pepall et al., 2008, ch. 16).   
2.2 The audit market setting 
Yardley et al. (1992) and Beattie and Fearnley (1994) review industrial organisational 
theory and its relation to the audit market.  The unique characteristics of the audit 
market (e.g. statutory requirement for audit and regulated activity) mean that the 
determinants and consequences of concentration are especially difficult to assess 
using theoretical analysis and, therefore, must be investigated empirically.  The 
demand for audit is inelastic (as audit is a statutory requirement for listed companies) 
and there is the possibility of cross-subsidisation of audit fees arising from the 
provision of non-audit services (NAS).  Key general influences on the audit market 
are economic, political and regulatory in nature:  stage in the economic cycle, shocks 
caused by financial scandals such as Enron and regulatory intervention into the audit 
market (e.g. corporate governance codes; US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).  The 
demand from company managers, company board and shareholders for low cost 
versus high quality audits varies over time.  The actual level of concentration and 
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competition (both price and quality) is the result of complex interactions between 
these general influences, mediated by specific company and audit firm factors.   
2.3 Sources of change in market concentration 
There are three principal sources of change in concentration: change in the set of 
consumers; change in the set of providers; and realignments (switches).  Change in 
the set of consumers results from new companies entering or exiting the market 
through initial public offerings, insolvencies and mergers (Beattie et al., 2003).  
Further, in the case of the market for public listed companies, delisting, re-admission 
and temporary suspension will also affect the measured concentration level in that 
particular market segment. 
Changes in the set of suppliers can occur as a result of audit firm merger or demise.  
In the case of the market for audit services, merger is generally stated as the main 
reason for increased concentration.  Mergers and acquisitions have been used as a 
means for audit firms to expand their business to achieve greater economies of scale 
and also industry-specific expertise (GAO, 2003).  Gramling and Stone (2001) note 
that audit industry expertise may potentially improve firm efficiency through 
economies of scale resulting from concentrating resources and technology investment 
in specific industries.  However, industry expertise can also create barriers to entry for 
competitors, especially for smaller firms.  Gramling and Stone (2001) also note that 
professional standards and emergent risk-based audit technologies demand that audit 
firms integrate industry expertise into their audit approaches and, as such, auditor 
specialisation has become both a minimum requirement and a barrier to entry in the 
audit service market. 
Industry specialisation, however, is not the only barrier that smaller firms are facing.  
According to GAO (2003), high capital requirements, lack of recommendation by 
capital market participants and high litigation risk and insurance costs are also 
important, particularly in the case of the audit market for public listed companies.8,9  
The demise of large audit firms, though very rare, is also popularly thought to 
increase market concentration.  Interestingly, however, neither Comunale and Sexton 
(2003) nor Duxbury et al. (2007) produce this result using Markov chain modelling in 
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relation to the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger.  Further, based on EU data, Ballas 
(2005) did not find that concentration increased following Andersen’s demise. 
Voluntary realignments are said to occur where companies initiate the auditor change.  
In the UK and many other countries, companies are free to change and to select a new 
auditor, with shareholders’ approval.  The main reasons for voluntary realignment in 
the UK during the 1990s have been shown to be high audit fee, dissatisfaction with 
the auditor’s ability to detect problems, changes in company’s top management, the 
need for group auditor rationalisation, the perceived need for a Big 6 auditor, and a 
company’s merger or takeover (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998).  If there is an underlying 
preference for the leading suppliers (currently the Big 4 firms), then these 
realignments, provided that other factors remain equal, will result in rising 
concentration (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Beattie et al., 2003).  Audit firm 
resignations are uncommon and signal forced change for the client company.10  
However, the political climate may cause some audit firms to reassess the risk profile 
of their client portfolio and they may not seek reappointment in the case of ‘risky’ 
clients.11   
The informed interpretation of observed changes in market concentration requires an 
understanding of the nature and relative importance of these various underlying 
sources of change. 
2.4 Empirical studies of concentration in the UK listed company audit market 
The number of audit firms active in the market has been used as an indicator of 
market structure.  The two concentration measures reported in prior studies are the k-
firm concentration ratio (CR) and, less commonly, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
(HI).  These measures are based on either number of audits or audit fees.  Table 1 
summarises the findings from 15 prior academic and professional studies on 
concentration in the UK market, covering the 35 year period 1972-2007.  By 
organising the findings according to time and measure, the trend over time is revealed.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Column 3 of Table 1 show that great care must be taken when comparing the findings 
from different studies and what is included in the definition of listed companies can 
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vary greatly.  In several studies (Moizer and Turley, 1987, 1989; McMeeking 2007), 
only the largest companies are included, while in another (Oxera, 2006) there is a bias 
towards the largest companies.  Some studies include only a sample of companies 
(McMeeking et al., 2007) while others exclude Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
companies, which are generally smaller than main market companies.  The number of 
companies on the main market has been declining steadily for 10 years, while the 
number of AIM companies has been rising at a much faster rate.  For this reason, it is 
increasingly important that studies include this sector of the listed company market to 
avoid the upward distortion of the large-company focus on concentration measures 
based only on the main market.  Finally, two studies (Pong, 1999; Pong and Burnett, 
2006) exclude investment trusts, although this will have no systematic effect provided 
that they have a similar size distribution to the other companies included in the 
sample.12  These choices greatly affect the number of companies included in the ‘UK 
listed’ sample (see column 4 of Table 1). 
Notwithstanding these sampling differences, the general trend over time is one of 
increasing concentration.  In discussing this trend, results from Moizer and Turley 
(1987, 1989) (rows 1 and 2) and FRC (2007b) (final row) have been ignored due to 
the restricted samples used.  The number of active audit firms has fallen from 362 in 
1984 to 85 in 2002 (the figure of 66 for 2001 reported by Pong and Burnett (2006) can 
perhaps be attributed to their exclusion of some listed companies).13  The four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4), based on number of audits, has risen from 0.38 in 1984 to 
0.83 in 2006. Evidence based on the more informative audit fee measure is more 
limited, but the trend is from 0.77 in 1991 to between 0.93 and 0.97 in 2003/5 
(depending on the sample used).  Measures of the Herfindahl index based on audit 
fees indicate a significant increase in concentration (15.9 in 1992 rising to 24.8 in 
2001). 
Few studies report a comprehensive set of concentration indicators, and the most 
recent studies to offer a reasonably full picture are Pong (1999) for 1995 and Pong 
and Burnett (2006) for 1997 and 2001.  In particular, the recent official studies (the 
Oxera Report commissioned by the UK Department of Trade and Industry/Financial 
Reporting Council and the UK Public Oversight Board (POB) annual accountancy 
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profession statistics) focus on CR4 for a restricted (and unreported) number of 
companies.  
In a recent published study of the entire population of UK listed companies, Beattie et 
al. (2003) analysed the effect of Andersen’s demise on audit market concentration (on 
a pro forma basis) and estimated that the top four firms were likely to increase their 
market share from about 67% to 73% and from about 90% to 96% on the basis of 
number of audits and audit fees, respectively.  The study identified that the levels of 
concentration were significantly higher in premier market segments (i.e. FTSE 100 
and 250) and in certain industry sectors.  Based on actual data drawn from Public 
Accounting Reports, Feldman (2006) reports that Andersen’s exit from the market 
increased concentration by the top four firms from 85% to 95%.  
High and rising levels of audit market concentration have been reported in numerous 
academic studies undertaken in non-UK countries (e.g., in the US: Wolk et al., 2001 
and GAO, 2003; in Australia: Thavapalan et al., 2002; in Germany: Quick and Wolz, 
1999; in international markets: Choi and Zeghal, 1999; Narasimhan and Chung, 1998; 
in the EU: Ballas, 2005).  For example, in the US the top four firms audited 63% of 
total public companies’ sales in 1988, rising to 71% by 1997 and 99% by 2002 (GAO, 
2003).14
2.5 Evidence on the consequences of concentration 
Evidence from audit market concentration studies suggests that increased market 
concentration does not necessarily decrease competition.  For instance, while the 
merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand increased the Big 5 
market share at the aggregate market level, Thavapalan et al. (2002) report that, for a 
number of industry sectors in Australia, a more equitable spread of audit clients 
between the Big 5 firms was achieved.  The GAO (2003) study also found no 
empirical evidence to support the contention that competition in the audit service 
market has been impaired, similar to the earlier studies such as Dopuch and Simunic 
(1980) and Danos and Eichenseher (1986).   
2.6 Consequences of Andersen’s demise 
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Many studies have investigated the impact of Andersen’s demise on issues other than 
concentration, in particular, auditor selection decisions and audit pricing.  In an 
analytical paper, Schloetzer (2006) analyses a Cournot model of oligopoly to explore 
the impact of Andersen’s break-up.  The model predicts that the number of audits 
completed by the remaining Big 4 audit firms will decline, due to short-run capacity 
constraints, creating an increase in switching to non-Big 4 firms.  He reports evidence 
consistent with this prediction.  Empirical studies of audit pricing following 
Andersen’s demise mostly relate to the US market.  Chi (2006), using US data, finds 
that audit fees across all companies have generally risen following the Andersen 
event.  However, the phenomenon of initial fee discounting is apparent, and among 
Big 4 clients is statistically greater for former Andersen clients than for non-former 
Andersen clients.  Asthana et al. (2004) report that audit fees and the audit fee rate (as 
a percentage of total assets) of US companies rose markedly in 2002 following the 
Enron scandal, especially for larger, riskier clients.  However, they find that former 
Andersen clients actually pay lower audit fees in 2002 compared to continuing clients 
of the Big 4 firms, which is evidence consistent with a competitive market for former 
Andersen clients.  Kealey et al. (2007) examine, for a sample of 547 US companies, 
the impact of audit firm tenure on the level of audit fees paid to Andersen’s successor 
auditors.  The observed positive relationship is attributed to the perceived higher level 
of client risk associated with longer tenure.  The change in audit fees arising from the 
change in auditor is not, however, explored.  Kohlbeck et al. (2008) report that clients 
who followed their Andersen audit team paid about the same as in the previous year 
(i.e., they neither received a ‘low-balling’ discount nor paid a premium).  Those that 
did not follow the Andersen audit team but moved to another Big 4 auditor paid a 
premium fee while companies hiring a non-Big 4 audit firm obtained a discounted 
audit fee, broadly similar in size to the amount of low-balling discount in non-
Andersen audit changes.  Finally, Vermeer (2008) focuses on the non-profit sector of 
the US market, providing descriptive data on the type of successor auditor selected 
and the impact on audit fees.   
Outside the US, evidence is limited.  Hamilton et al. (2008), using Australian data, 
conclude that overall the market remained competitive following Andersen’s break-
up. However, they find higher premiums generally for Big 4 audits post-Andersen and 
the audit fee data reported for former Andersen clients show an above-inflation rise in 
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aggregate audit fees of 9.8% (derived from Table 1, panel B), though these are not 
adjusted for the apparent changes (reductions) in auditee size; aggregate NAS for 
former Andersen clients declined by 1%.  The only UK study to date is an 
unpublished study by Basioudis and Papadimitriou (2007), who find no change in 
inflation-adjusted audit fees between 2001 and 2002 for former Andersen clients (the 
unadjusted increase is 10%). Their analysis, however, is based on a restricted sample 
of only 63 companies.  Thus, the available evidence in relation to the pricing effect of 
Andersen’s demise is conflicting.   
Researchers have noted that standard, single period cross-sectional audit fee models 
do not address ‘the dynamics of changes in audit fees’ and that call for further 
research on this important issue (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007, p.198).  The Andersen 
failure offers a quasi-experimental setting in which the factors impacting changes in 
audit fees can be observed.15   
2.7 Hypotheses 
Traditional industrial economics theory predicts that mergers will increase market 
concentration and (in certain circumstances) increase profits.  Translating these 
predictions into the audit setting is, however, problematic.  As audit firm costs are 
unobservable, audit fees (revenues rather than profits) must generally be used to proxy 
for profits.  Further, the market for audit services and the market for NAS are linked 
due to knowledge spillovers (Stein, 2006), which introduces an additional strategic 
interaction variable.  The scandal associated with Andersen’s demise gave rise to a 
unique merger situation in which the demand for monitoring, which is costly, 
increased.  However, to set against this, the selection of an audit firm requiring a new 
audit team incurs costly switching costs.   
 
Given the audit firm’s demise, companies were forced to change from Andersen 
acting as both auditor and as the firm providing the consultancy reflected in the NAS 
reported in the financial statements.  They could choose whether to use the newly 
appointed auditor (resulting in reported NAS) or a different firm to provide NAS (and 
zero reported NAS).  Given the political pressure to avoid potential conflict of 
interests in joint provision, the reported NAS might be expected to fall to reduce the 
perceived (or real) threat to auditor independence.  Alternatively, knowledge 
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spillovers and/or the new auditor’s desire for increased fees and profit via cross-
subsidisation of the audit fee might lead to increased reported NAS.  
 
Based on the above discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature, the 
following specific hypotheses in relation to the Andersen break-up are tested; 
following Andersen’s demise: 
 
H1: Audit fees generally increased. 
H2: Market concentration increased. 
H3: Ex-Andersen clients’ audit fees increased. 
H4: Big 4 firms (but not Deloitte & Touche, the audit firm that took over 
Andersen in the UK) benefited from audit fee premiums from ex-Andersen 
clients. 
H5a: Reported NAS fees decreased following Andersen’s demise (consistent 
with response to concerns over independence threats). 
H5b: Reported NAS fees increased following Andersen’s demise (consistent 
with knowledge spillovers and/or audit fee cross-subsidisation). 
 
3.  METHODS 
The audit market examined in the present study concerns the auditors of all domestic 
UK companies listed on both the main and AIM markets of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) for the period 1998 through 2003. Information about companies, 
their auditors and industry classification was extracted from the Waterlow Stock 
Exchange Yearbook (SEYB).16  Accounting data (sales, total assets and audit fees) 
were mainly sourced from Datastream with recourse to FAME and annual reports to 
fill in missing data. These data requirements reduced the sample size and led to the 
exclusion of investment trust companies, in particular. For companies identified as 
having changed auditors, audit firm details were cross-checked against annual reports 
or, in the few situations where these were not available, against data in FAME.  
Changes in the audit market can be caused by the entry and exit of companies to and 
from the stock exchange.  Information about newly listed companies, re-admission 
and new issues was obtained from the ‘Primary market fact sheet’ published by the 
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LSE.  Information about delisted companies was sourced from Hemscott, Datastream 
and Citytext. Audit firm mergers in the 1998 to 2003 period were identified from 
Boys (2003) and individual audit firms’ web pages. 
Three measures of market concentration have been applied previously in audit market 
studies. The two widely used measures are the k-firm concentration ratio (CR) and the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HI). The third measure, the Gini Coefficient, though 
used in many economic related studies to measure inequality in wealth is relatively 
new to audit market studies. It was used by Quick and Wolz (1999) in their 
investigation of the German audit market.  A description of each measure follows. 
The k-firm concentration ratio measures the proportion of total output in an industry 
produced by a given number of the largest firms in the industry.  It is calculated as 
follows:   
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where: 
n = the total number of audit firms in the market,  
k = the number of largest firms considered, and 
xi = the market share of each audit firm (typically based on the number of audits,  
audit fees, or proxies for client size such as total assets or sales). 
 
The second measure, the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HI) index, is a market-wide 
concentration measure that is sensitive to the number of active firms and to the 
variance in activity levels across firms.  It has been used in the US to aid in the 
interpretation of concentration data (GAO, 2003) and is calculated as follows: 
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The upper and lower bounds of the HI index are 100 and 0.  If there is only one firm 
active in the market the index equals 100, while the index approaches 0 when there 
are numerous firms of equal size. The HI has two advantages over concentration 
ratios. First, it is based on all market participants rather than just the k largest firms 
(Pong, 1999). Second, it gives a better indication of the relative market control of the 
largest firms (as a result of the squared measure). For example, a 4-firm concentration 
ratio of 80% could be made up of one firm with 60% and three sharing the 20%, or 
perhaps four firms having 20%. The former would result in a higher HI measure, 
reflecting the concentration in the largest firm (Wootton et al., 1994).  
The Gini coefficient is closely linked to the Lorenz curve and measures something 
subtly different to CR and HI, namely the inequality between market participants. 
This can be of specific benefit when comparing the market shares within the Big5/4 
group, for example. Its value lies between 0 and 100, where 0 means perfect equality 
and 100 means perfect inequality (i.e., one firm has all the income with everyone else 
earning nothing).  The higher the coefficient, the greater the inequality of income in 
the market.  An advantage of the Gini coefficient is that it is not easily affected or 
disturbed by changes in the size of a population. If the data is ordered by increasing 
size of market share, it is calculated as follows:17
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i   =  market share rank (from smallest to largest), and 
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1x  (i.e., the mean market share). 
All three measures provide an indication of market concentration for the aggregate 
audit market. To obtain more information about the dominance of individual 
participating firms, the calculation of individual audit firms’ market share is required.   
Four different measures of market share have been used to date.  The number of 
audits is perhaps the most commonly used measure; it is intuitive, facilitates 
reconciliation with changes in the population of consumers and auditor switches and 
its calculation requires knowledge only of the identity of the auditor.  However, the 
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existence of an audit is a poor measure of activity level and so, in settings where audit 
fees are disclosed, audit fees are used as the measure of choice.  Concentration 
measures based on number of audits, while highly correlated with measures based on 
audit fees, are known to be systematically lower due to the ‘size effect’, whereby 
large companies tend to employ large audit firms.  In settings where audit fees are not 
disclosed, inferior measures of total assets or total sales are used to proxy activity 
level; in the present study, the preferred measure of audit fees is used.   
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the six-year period.  The number of 
companies decreased from 1,607 in 1998 to 1,386 in 2003, with the number of audit 
firms decreasing from 85 to 72. To put this trend into context, in 1968 there were 
1,109 audit firms active in the public listed market (Briston and Kedslie, 1985). 
Further, the 72 ‘active’ audit firms represent a tiny proportion of the nearly 20,000 
accounting firms in the UK (International Financial Services, 2003). The small 
number of ‘active’ audit firms suggests significant barriers to entry in the public listed 
company audit market.  It may be noted that a similar number of ‘active’ firms (85) 
audit the much larger US market (7,006 public companies) (Who Audits America, 
2003). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Auditee company size, with respect to total assets, ranged from just £3,000 to a high 
of £455 billion.  In term of sales, some companies in each year reported £0 sales and 
the highest sales reported was £61 billion in 2002.  The mean values for both total 
assets and sales increased by considerably more than inflation over the period (see 
RPI change in Table 2, row 4).  As mean values can be heavily influenced by outliers, 
the median is also shown.  Over the six year period, the median values of total assets 
and sales fell by 10% and 20%, respectively.  The rise in mean and fall in median 
reflect an increase in the numbers of both large and very small companies since 1998.  
A comparison of the size distributions (based on total assets) in 1998 and 2003 shows 
that the proportion of companies with assets above £500 million increased from 16% 
to 20%, and the proportion below £30 million from 37% to 42%.  
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Audit fees ranged between £1,000 and £18 million.  Over the six year period, mean 
(median) audit fees rose by 35% (10%) compared with general price inflation of 11%.  
The increase in the mean ahead of inflation may reflect high increases in audit fees for 
large companies and/or the higher proportion of large companies in the population 
already identified.  Therefore, to explore whether the increase in audit fees merely 
reflects an increase in client size, the rate of audit fees per unit of size is reported. The 
last two panels in Table 2 show that, in terms of aggregate audit fee charged related to 
total assets, the rate fell from 1998 to a low in 2001 then picked up in 2002; the trend 
based on sales was broadly similar. The mean value of individual fee rates suggests 
that there was a sizeable increase in audit fee rate (scaled by total assets) in 2001 and 
2002.18  The corresponding increase in median audit fee rate is much more moderate.  
By contrast, both mean and median audit fee rates based on sales started to increase 
earlier (in 2000) and showed a decrease by 2003.   
One plausible explanation for the mid-period increase is the regulatory and public 
response to Andersen’s misconduct. Following the downfall of Andersen and the 
subsequent public concern about audit quality, companies had a smaller number of 
large auditors to choose from, so the remaining audit firms had greater market power. 
The early increase in audit fee rates in 2001 can perhaps be linked to the auditing 
industry atmosphere during the period. As widely reported in the press, the Enron 
scandal began in 2000, with Enron filing for the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in U.S. history in 2001. 
To further investigate how Andersen’s demise and related events affected the cost of 
audits, audit fee rates (per £000 total assets) for each size decile of companies are 
analysed for each of the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 (see Table 3 and Figure 1). The 
graph in Figure 1 clearly shows that, as expected due to fixed costs and audit scale 
economies, the audit fee rate decreases as company size increases. Comparison over 
time reveals that the mean (and median) audit fee rate increased between 2001 and 
2003 for each decile of company size.  However, as shown in Table 3, the smallest 
companies have experienced a major (and statistically significant) increase of 155% 
(53%) in mean (median) audit fee rates, in contrast to an increase of 13% (19%) for 
the largest companies.  
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Thus, there is evidence of significant upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 for 
smaller audit clients. However, attribution of causation is not straightforward. The 
price rises might reflect a general economic improvement which enabled auditors to 
catch up on price increases delayed as a result of the 2001 UK downturn. 
Alternatively, they might reflect a genuine ‘Andersen effect’ (consistent with 
Hypothesis 1): either auditors have undertaken additional audit work and passed on 
the increased costs to clients or, perhaps, they have taken advantage of their increased 
market power following the reduction to four top tier auditors.  
INSERT TABLE 3 and FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Aggregate audit market concentration 
Table 4 reports the level of auditor concentration from 1998 to 2003 using two 
different measures of market share19 and three different measures of concentration 
(CR – rows 1-4; HI – row 5; and Gini – rows 6-7). Based on both market share 
measures, the CR4 concentration ratio increased over the six-year period, particularly 
in 2002 and 2003 with the transfer of a majority of Andersen clients to other Big 4 
auditors (see later). Thus, there is some evidence to support Hypothesis 2.  However, 
the aggregate market share of the large top tier auditors (shown as CR (Big 5/4) in the 
table) generally increased by much less. A notable contradiction here is the CR (Big 
5/4) market share based on number of audits, which fell every year in the period (a 
pattern not shared with the Australian market (Hamilton et al., 2008)); over the six 
year period the decline from 76% to 68% was statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In other words, audit fee income for top tier auditors has risen while the number of 
auditees has fallen. This is consistent with the argument and evidence that the Big 5/4 
auditors have shifted their client portfolio towards larger, less risky, clients (Jones and 
Raghunandan, 1998; Rama and Read, 2006).20  CR6 and CR20 have been relatively 
stable over the six-year period across both measures. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Focusing on the concentration statistics based on the preferred audit fee proxy (panel 
B), the level of audit market concentration in the UK during the 6 year period has 
remained very high. In 1998 the top tier firms (then Big 5) audited 95% of the market 
and by 2003 this had grown to 96% (now Big 4). The increases in CR4 and CR6 over 
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the period are statistically significant at the 1% level (2-tail).  Looking back to 1991,21 
the top tier (then Big 6) had a markedly lower market share of 89% (Pong, 1999).  
The domination of the top tier firms clearly exceeds the economists’ 60% tight 
oligopoly threshold (Shepherd, 1997). The UK domestic listed audit market was a 
tight oligopoly by any market share proxy during the period of the present study (and 
back to 1991 at least). The lowest CR (Big5/4) was 68% in 2003 (number of audits) 
but was consistently above 94% based on audit fees. Such high concentration levels 
facilitate the possibility of successful collusion, overt or tacit, between the top firms.  
In contrast to the k-firm concentration ratio, the more comprehensive HI and Gini 
coefficients for the whole market suggest a slight net decline in audit market 
concentration over the six year period. This contrasts with evidence from the US 
which finds concentration to have increased (Feldman, 2006). These contrasting 
outcomes can perhaps be attributed to the substantially smaller market share of 
Andersen in the UK compared to the US; based on audit fees for 2001, Andersen’s 
market share was 8.8% in the UK (Pong and Burnett, 2006) and 15.9% in the US 
(Feldman, 2006).  In the UK, the HI measure fell between 1998 and 2001 to 25.0 after 
which it began to rise slowly to 27.0 in 2003. The 2001 value is almost identical to the 
24.8 reported by Pong and Burnett (2006) but the 25.8 for 2002 is slightly higher than 
the 23.0 which McMeeking et al. (2007) report, based on their smaller sample.  The 
Gini coefficient for the whole market (penultimate row in each panel) declined 
slightly to 2000 and then remained broadly stable. 
In the US, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission classify the 
HI into three regions with a value below 10 characterising an unconcentrated market, 
a value between 10 to 18 characterising a moderately concentrated market and a value 
above 18 characterising a highly concentrated market (GAO, 2003). The present study 
reports an HI (based on number of audits) ranging between 12 and 14 (signalling 
moderate concentration).  However, HI based on audit fees ranged between 25 and 28, 
signalling a highly concentrated audit market with potential for significant market 
power. 
The Gini (whole market) coefficient remained very high throughout the entire period 
suggesting considerable inequality of market share across auditor participants.  
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However, while the Andersen demise had little impact on the overall picture, it has 
markedly reduced the level of inequality between the top tier firms. Looking back to 
1991 and 1995, the Gini coefficients for top tier (then Big 6) market share based on 
audit fees were 29 and 30, respectively.22  The final row in panel B reports the Gini 
(Big 5/4) coefficient for the study period.  In 1998, the coefficient had risen to 48 (for 
the Big 5) but the impact of the redistribution of former Andersen clients reduced this 
to 30 (for the Big 4) by 2003.23 Thus, the equality of audit market share for the four 
top tier firms has now returned to the level it was at prior to the Price 
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand merger. This is explored further in the next section. 
4.3 Individual firm market share at market level 
Given the current interest in auditor choice and the viability of a challenge to the Big 
4 by mid-tier firms (FRC, 2007b), analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit 
firm level (for the top tier and six leading mid tier firms).  Several observations can be 
made from the detailed analysis of market shares by individual firm shown in Table 5. 
Based on audit fee ranking, PwC was the market leader with total market share of 
about 40%, a level that industrial organisation theorists cite as the cut-off level to 
identify the existence of a ‘dominant firm’ (Beattie et al., 2003).  It is interesting to 
note that the PwC market share was always markedly higher than that of the number 
two firm throughout the period.  KPMG, the nearest rival, held only 23-26% of the 
market share.  According to Shepherd (1997), a dominant firm usually has two effects 
on prices similar to those of pure monopoly. First, they raise the level of their prices, 
often (though not always) gaining excess profits. Second, they engage in price 
discrimination.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Over the full 1998 to 2003 period, the market share of PwC and KPMG declined 
slightly (both number of audits and audit fees) while that of Ernst & Young declined 
based on number of audits but increased a little based on audit fees. Following its 
acquisition of Andersen, Deloitte gained considerably both in terms of audit fees and 
number of audits during 2002 and 2003. Interestingly, these gains continued an 
upward trend that started much earlier than Andersen’s demise and saw its market 
share almost double (number of audits) with a larger increase based on audit fees. 
 20
Overall, the Big 4 are now more closely aligned in terms of audit market share as 
indicated by the Gini coefficients discussed in the previous section. 
By contrast, the audit fee market share gap between the Big 4 and other smaller firms 
has become wider over the 6 year period. This is clearly demonstrated by comparing 
the market shares of Ernst & Young, the smallest of the Big 4, and of the non-Big 4 
auditors. Based on audit fees, E&Y had 13% market share in 2003, which was more 
than three times as large as the entire non-Big 4 market share (4%). BDO Stoy 
Hayward, the closest rival to the Big 4, held just above 1% market share, indicating its 
very weak position relative to the Big 4.  It is worth noting, however, that the mid-tier 
consolidation merger between Grant Thornton and Robson Rhodes in the summer of 
2007 serves to narrow the gap slightly.  
4.4 Changes in Big 5/4 market dominance 
To examine the underlying factors that have contributed to changes in concentration, a 
decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the 
1998 to 2003 period is presented in Table 6.  The impact of four distinct consumer-
based reasons for change is calculated: leavers; net joiners; non-par auditor switches; 
and (in the case of audit fees measure only) audit fee changes. Panels A and B focus 
on number of audits and audit fees, respectively. Leaver companies include those that 
were acquired, failed, went private or left the market for any other reason. The 
analysis of joiners recognises that some joiners may have left the market by 2003.  
The analysis of switchers focuses on non-par auditor changes (i.e., those involving a 
change in audit firm tier).  In total, there were 464 switches, representing 5.8% per 
annum using the number of audits in 1998 (1607) as the baseline; of these, almost half 
(202) were non-par changes. 
Panel A shows an overall reduction in Big 5/4 market share of 7.4% (from 75.9% to 
68.5%) based on number of audits.  The Big 5/4 audited about 75% of the leaver 
companies that were listed in 1998, closely in line with their overall market share in 
1998. However, they had a much smaller market share (51%) of companies joining 
the market since 1998, which accounts for the overall reduction in the Big 5/4 market 
share based on number of audits. The impact of non-par switches between Big 5/4 and 
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other auditing firms was broadly neutral, with the Big 5/4 showing a small net loss of 
4 audits.   
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The analysis of market share based on audit fees (Panel B) shows differences in the 
scale and overall impact of factors. The Big 5/4 market share shows an overall 
increase between 1998 and 2003 of 1.0% (from 94.9% to 95.9%). The Big 5/4’s 
lower market share of leavers (91%) implies a higher market share of continuing 
companies, up 1.4% from 94.9% to 96.3%.  This represents the largest cause of the 
overall change in concentration. The change in continuing clients’ audit fees had a 
small negative impact on concentration (decline of 0.5%).  While the Big 5/4 audited 
just over half of joiners, these tended to be the larger joining companies so the audit 
fees represented 88% of the total for joiners. Of these joiners, 62 had left the market 
by 2003 and the Big 5/4 share of their audit fees was 76%. Together, this left the Big 
5/4 with 91% market share of joiner audit fees. However, as this was below their 
overall 1998 market share, the impact was to reduce slightly their market share, 
contributing a reduction of 0.5% in concentration. While there was a very small net 
loss of audits by Big 5/4 to others, the Big 5/4 actually achieved a net gain in audit 
fees from voluntary auditor change of £2.8 million; this led to a small rise (0.6%) in 
audit fee market share.  
In summary, since 1998 the Big 5/4 have a smaller number of audits (279 less), 
primarily because they audit a smaller number of new entrants to the market. 
However, they have managed to increase audit fees (by £66 million) and their share of 
audit fees, as a result of two main factors. First, the Big 5/4 have retained a larger 
share of audit fees for companies that have remained in the market. This is consistent 
with the retention of Big 5/4 auditors by companies that have grown either organically 
or by acquisition. Second, they tended to gain larger companies as clients as a result 
of switches. This may reflect a Big 5/4 strategy of avoiding audits which they 
perceive to be high-risk, as evidenced in the US (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; 
Rama and Read, 2006). 
4.5 Industry concentration 
 22
Beattie et al. (2003) showed that in 2002 the Big 5 audited the entire FTSE 100 
companies and almost 98% of the FTSE 250 companies.24 Apart from auditor 
reputation, it has been argued that an auditor’s technical capability in specific industry 
sectors is the main factor that causes large companies to choose a top tier auditor 
(Neal and Riley, 2004; Ferguson et al., 2006; Knechel et al., 2007). This industry-
specific technical capability can be achieved by specialisation, at both the national and 
city level (Ferguson et al., 2006; Basioudis and Francis, 2007).25  Table 7 presents 
auditor market share (based on audit fees) in industry sectors for 2003. This shows 
that one of the Big 4 firms was the market leader in every one of the 34 industry 
sectors.  PwC was the leader in 18 industries, KPMG was the leader in eight, while 
Deloitte and Ernst & Young were both leaders in four industries.   
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
There is no consensus on the level of market share that indicates industry specialism. 
Prior studies have used various levels of market share including 10% and 20% 
(Craswell et al., 1995), 30% (Knechel et al., 2007) and more recently 50% (Beattie et 
al., 2003).  Table 7 identifies the market leader in each sector (underlined) as well as 
the auditors in the 20 sectors where a market share of at least 50% is held (in bold).  
From the table, the leading position of PwC among the Big 4 is clear (see summary at 
bottom of table).  PwC audits the entire tobacco sector (three companies) and has 
more than 90% market share in the oil and gas (31 companies) and steel and other 
metals (four companies) sectors.  Overall, PwC is the market leader in 18 sectors and 
has at least 50% market share in 11 sectors.  By comparison KPMG, Deloitte and 
Ernst & Young have at least 50% market share in only six, one and two sectors, 
respectively. In the UK in 2003, the average market share of the industry leader 
(across 29 non-financial sectors) was 58%, with the second ranking firm having 
22%.26
Focussing on the relatively large sectors (by number of companies), 17 contain 30 or 
more companies (Craswell et al., 1995). PwC was market leader in 10 of these large 
sectors. Just five sectors had a market leader auditor with at least 50% market share 
(PwC for 4 sectors and Ernst & Young for 1). Based on market capitalisation, there 
were 13 sectors larger than £50 billion. However, only PwC and KPMG had more 
than 50% market share in those sectors (PwC for 3 sectors and KPMG for 3). PwC 
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was the market leader in six sectors, while KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young were 
the leaders in four, two and one sector, respectively. 
In aggregate, the Big 4 clearly dominated all sectors, with their lowest market share 
being 87% (in Housing Goods & Textiles, a sector with a large number of small 
companies). The Big 4 has complete dominance in four sectors: Forestry & Paper, 
Tobacco, Banks and Life Assurance.  The dominance of one or two Big 4 auditors in 
a significant number of sectors is likely to be of concern to companies desiring an 
industry-specialist auditor. It implies that their choice is severely restricted, especially 
if they wish to avoid the auditor of a competitor. Further, while most of the sectors 
dominated by a single Big 4 auditor (>50% market share) are relatively small in terms 
of the number of companies (26% of the 1,386 companies are in such sectors), they 
represent a significant part of the market with 52% of market capitalisation. 
In eleven sectors, however, one or more mid-tier firms did claim a significant 
presence (≥ 2% audit fees) and in 9 sectors a mid-tier firm’s market share exceeded 
that of one of the B4 firms.  There were only two mid-tier firm sector market shares in 
excess of 5% - BDO Stoy Hayward held 7.8% in General Retailers and Grant 
Thornton held 7.3% in Electronic & Electrical Equipment.  But, in two further sectors, 
‘other’ smaller non-Big 4 auditors (i.e., firms not identified separately in the table) in 
aggregate held significant market shares – 6.9% in Housing Goods and Textiles and 
5.9% in Diversified Industrials. These findings offer some hope that, if the 
recommendations of the FRC (2007b) audit choice study are put in place, mid-tier 
firms may, in the medium-term, represent viable alternatives to a B4 auditor.   
4.6 Analysis of auditor choice and fees paid by former Andersen clients  
In 2001, Andersen had 97 clients who changed auditor the following year, while in 
2002 Andersen had 36 clients remaining (those with fiscal year ended before August). 
As the focus in this section is a pre/post comparison, eight companies that delisted in 
2002 or 2003 were removed, leaving 125 former Andersen clients for analysis. 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Table 8 provides a summary for former Andersen clients of the successor auditor 
(panel A) and, for each successor, aggregate audit fees, median audit fee rates pre and 
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post change, aggregate NAS fees and aggregate total fees (panels B to E, 
respectively).  Different rows of the table distinguish different key groupings of audit 
firms – in particular, the B4 excluding Deloitte, in addition to the B4 and non-B4.  
Panel A shows that Deloitte, Andersen’s UK acquirer, captured 93 (74%) former 
Andersen clients; 21 (17%) companies moved to another Big 4 auditor and 11 (9%) 
chose non-Big 4 firms.  The largest non-Big 4 beneficiaries were BDO Stoy Hayward 
and Robson Rhodes, both second tier firms with international operations.  The 
percentage of companies that switched to another Big 4 was slightly higher in the UK 
than in the US. The GAO (2003) study reported that 86% of former Andersen clients 
chose another Big 4 auditor (including Deloitte) and 14% switched to a non-Big 4 
auditor. In the US, the switch to other Big 4 firms was more uniform than in the UK: 
Ernst & Young (26%); KPMG (25%); Deloitte (20%); and PwC (15%).  Of 1,085 
former Andersen US clients, the study reported that 717 (66%) companies switched to 
non-Deloitte Big 4 (compared to only 17% in the UK).   
Andersen clients’ global preference towards another Big 4 firm is not unexpected 
given the international reputation and capability of the Big 4.  The figures in Table 8 
give an indication of the redistribution of clients that might occur if there were to be a 
further reduction from a B4 to a B3 (a scenario considered by FRC, 2007b).  In 
addition, the importance to such companies of restoring investor and other stakeholder 
confidence was high. For example, Chaney and Philipich (2002) provide evidence that 
many former Andersen clients had experienced negative market reaction when 
Andersen admitted to shredding Enron’s documents. 
Panels B reports aggregate audit fees.  For new Big 4 auditors, aggregate audit fees 
rose by 4.0% in contrast to a decline of -12.0% for new non-Big 4 auditors; the 
median change in audit fees for new Big 4 auditors was 0.0% compared with -10.0% 
for non-Big 4.  Across all clients, the change in aggregate audit fees was 3.8%, 
broadly in line with inflation, with a median audit fee change of 0.0%.  Thus, in 
rejection of Hypothesis 3 and in contrast with prior US and Australian research, there 
is no evidence of general above-inflation audit fee rises in the UK following 
Andersen’s demise.  
Similarly, there is no evidence of general fee discounting on initial audit engagement 
for former Andersen clients, in contrast with the evidence reported by Chi (2006) for 
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the US.  Ernst & Young gained the largest clients (based on total assets) and also 
achieved above-inflation audit fee increases of 11.7%, in aggregate.  Not surprisingly, 
the non-Big 4 gains were typically smaller companies with smaller audit fees.  The 
median decline in audit fee of -10.0% in respect of non-Big 4 successor auditors can 
be attributed to the loss of the Big 4 audit premium and/or more significant fee 
discounting on initial audit engagements by small auditors (as found in the US by 
Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006 and Kohlbeck et al., 2008). 
The overall 5.0% rise in audit fees for moves to Deloitte Touche, the acquirer of the 
Andersen UK business, is slightly above the rate of inflation.  This is broadly 
consistent with the ‘no change’ result for clients who followed the Andersen audit 
team in the US (Kohlbeck et al., 2008).  However, in contrast with their results, the 
aggregate audit fee increase for moves to other Big 4 auditors of 1.6% (median 
change of 0.0%) provides no evidence of a fee premium in the UK, which does not 
support Hypothesis 4. 
The audit fee rates (audit fees per £000 total assets) reported in Panel C seek to take 
client size changes over the year of change into account (albeit imperfectly).  Medians 
are reported to reduce the impact of outliers, though the small sample size for non-Big 
4 auditees and for individual Big 4 successors (except DT) still affects the stability of 
the median.  However, the median percentage change in audit fee rate was 3.0% 
(1.7%) for Big 4 (non-Big 4) and 2.4% overall; all are positive but again broadly in 
line with inflation, confirming that the audit fee results are not driven by changes in 
client size. 
Overall, the lack of clear evidence of real (i.e. above inflation) audit fee rises for 
Andersen clients is perhaps surprising.  These clients had a smaller pool of (large) 
audit firms from which to choose (especially when specialisation and refusal to 
appoint competitors’ auditors are considered), which creates a demand pressure.  The 
clients were also in a relatively weak bargaining position given their need to rebuild 
confidence.  It suggests that either there was still sufficient competition to negate 
oligopolistic excesses, or the Big 4 did not seek to extract excess profits, politically 
aware that their actions would be closely monitored. 
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Panel D reports the level of NAS provided by Andersen and by the successor auditor.  
It is interesting to consider whether the incentives to reduce NAS to counter a 
perceived lack of auditor independence are greater than the benefits of knowledge 
spillovers and/or of the cross-subsidisation of audit fees.  Overall, it is clear that 
reported NAS fees (i.e. those provided by the auditor) fell significantly in aggregate 
following Andersen’s demise: for Big 4 successors by -20%, for non-Big 4 by -47% 
and overall by -20%; the median change in NAS was -13.2% overall and -17.1% for 
the major acquirer DT.  Similarly, total fees (audit plus NAS) paid by auditees 
declined, by -12.2% overall (Panel E) with a median change of -3.9%.  Thus, there is 
no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit 
fee by NAS (Hypothesis 5b).  The evidence is consistent with the notion that audit 
firms and their clients responded to publicly-expressed concerns that NAS provision 
has the potential to affect external perceptions of auditor independence (Hypothesis 
5a). 
However, the detail shows that two audit firms (PwC and KPMG) did generate higher 
NAS fees than Andersen from the clients it took over. PwC generated an additional 
£0.7m NAS, also leading to an increase in total fees of £0.5m; the equivalent 
increases for KPMG were £0.5m (NAS) and £0.3m (total fees). The median changes 
in NAS for the individual four B4 auditors were: KPMG +8.4%; PwC 0.0%; DT 
-17.1%; and EY -52.6%. While this suggests that both KPMG and PwC may have 
gained, possibly from cross-subsidisation of audit fees by NAS income, this needs 
cautious interpretation given the very small sample sizes.  Further, given the major 
market share of PwC (Pong and Burnett, 2006), it is perhaps likely that PwC was 
already providing a higher level of consultancy services to Andersen-audited 
companies than other audit firms.  Any consultancy provided by the successor auditor 
prior to its commencement as auditor would need to be reported in the financial 
statements as NAS, potentially with greater impact for PwC than other firms.    
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and audit fee rates in the 
UK domestic listed company market during a crucial period of structural market 
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change (i.e., following the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ merger and encompassing 
Andersen’s demise, 1998-2003).  Concentration is measured using two different size 
measures (number of audits and audit fees) and three measures of concentration (the 
k-firm concentration ratio, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index and the Gini coefficient), 
offering a detailed and consistent insight into trends over the six year period.  
Analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit firm level (for both the top tier and 
leading mid-tier firms) and by 34 industry sectors.   
Concentration is shown to have been consistently high throughout the period, 
characteristic of a ‘tight oligopoly’.  Based on audit fees, the market share of the top 
tier (Big 5 in 1998; Big 4 in 2003) was 95% in 1998 and 96% in 2003.  However, 
there is clear evidence that concentration has, in a number of respects, shown a 
declining trend over the six-year period.  The top tier concentration ratio based on 
number of audits fell from 76% to 68% (significant at 1%).  Moreover, the more 
comprehensive measures (Herfindahl index and Gini coefficient) showed slight 
decreases for the market as a whole and marked decreases for the top tier (in terms of 
both number of audits and audit fees).  It can be concluded that Andersen’s demise 
has reduced the level of inequality between the top tier firms.  
Decomposition analysis indicates that the main factor underlying the drop in Big 5/4 
concentration based on number of audits was the relatively small number of audits 
gained from joiners, a market segment dominated by the mid-tier firms.  If the mid-
tier firms can retain these clients as they grow either organically or by acquisition, 
then market concentration will decrease.  The main factor underlying the slight 
increase in Big 5/4 concentration based on audit fees was the retention of Big 5/4 
auditors by companies that have grown either organically or by acquisition.  A 
secondary factor was that they tended to gain larger companies as clients as a result of 
switches.  This may reflect investor and client preferences for a top tier auditor as they 
grow, or a Big 5/4 strategy of avoiding the smaller (and therefore higher-risk) 
companies (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; Rama and Read, 2006).  The rate of 
auditor change was reasonably high (5.8% p.a.) over the period, higher than reported 
in prior UK studies (4.1% p.a. in Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; 4.5% p.a. in Pong, 
1999).  This could be argued to indicate signs of increased competition brought about, 
in particular, by audit committees exercising their responsibilities in relation to 
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auditor selection and appointment more actively during this period due to regulatory 
pronouncements in relation to corporate governance (e.g., Hampel Report, 1998; 
Smith Committee, 2003).  However, our evidence suggests that switching was not a 
major cause of change in concentration.  
Extant evidence from Australia and the UK indicates that it is industry specialism, at 
both national and city level, and not just brand name that contributes to fee premia 
and auditor selection choices (Ferguson et al., 2003; 2006; McMeeking et al., 2006; 
Basioudis and Francis, 2007).  This study shows that mid tier firms could compete 
effectively in certain industries where they already have a significant presence.  In 
eleven sectors, one or more mid-tier firms audited at least 2% audit fees, and in 9 
sectors a mid-tier firm’s market share exceeded that of one of the B4 firms.  An 
effective challenge from the mid-tier firms would be assisted by the implementation 
of the recommendations of the FRC (2007b) audit choice study.  It could be further 
assisted by the mid tier firms adopting a strategy of investing and marketing 
themselves on the basis of industry specialism. 
Andersen’s demise served to reduce the level of inequality between the top tier firms, 
with Deloitte capturing approximately 70% of Andersen clients and total audit fees.  
Thus, consistent with the findings of Comunale and Sexton (2003) in the US context 
and Ballas (2005) in the EU context (but contrary to popular belief) the exit of a top 
tier firm does not necessarily result in increased market concentration.  However, 
PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’, with 40% market share (based on audit 
fees) in 2003.  PwC was also market leader in 18 out of 34 industry sectors in 2003.  
Given these high levels of market concentration and the limited number of industry 
specialist firms, listed companies continue to face a restricted choice of audit firm in 
the short-term.  The small percentage of market share held by the non-Big 4 indicates 
the presence of significant barriers to entry faced by smaller firms.27
There is evidence that the audit fee rate of listed UK companies increased markedly 
following Andersen’s demise.  The mean (and median) audit fee rate (based on total 
assets) increased between 2001 and 2003 for each company size decile.  It was, 
however, the smallest companies that experienced a major (and statistically 
significant) increase of 155% (53%) in mean (median) audit fee rates, in contrast to an 
increase of 13% (19%) for the largest companies.  Given the lack of evidence 
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indicating anti-competitive behaviour by the top tier firms, despite high concentration 
levels, this finding supports the assertion that the Enron scandal lifted the intense 
pressure on audit fees and caused audit fees to increase substantially.  There was a 
desire by companies and audit firms to instil confidence about audit quality in the 
financial market participants after this was damaged by Andersen’s misconduct (the 
‘Andersen effect’).  Thus, companies wanted more effort from their auditor, placing 
upward pressure on audit fees.  Of course alternative interpretations are also 
consistent with the evidence – the audit fee rises may simply reflect changes in the 
general economic climate.   
In relation to former Andersen clients, there was no significant above-inflation change 
in audit fees paid by them to their new auditors (the aggregate increase was 3.8%, 
with a median increase of 0%),  The lack of evidence to indicate that recent structural 
changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing is consistent with Duxbury et al.’s 
(2007) modelling of the UK setting.  It contrasts, however, with the evidence in 
Australia, where former Andersen clients paid higher audit fees (Hamilton et al., 
2008) and in the US, where initial fee discounts were reported (Chi, 2006).  For non-
Big 4 successor auditors in the UK, we find a median decline in audit fee of -10.0%. 
This can be attributed to the loss of the Big 4 audit premium and/or more significant 
fee discounting on initial audit engagements by small auditors (as found in the US by 
Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  Moves to Big 4 auditors other than Deloitte Touche 
(who acquired most of the Andersen UK business) were not accompanied by an audit 
fee premium yet there was also no evidence of general fee discounting, both in 
contrast with the US (Chi, 2006).  Overall, the UK audit market response to 
Andersen’s decline seems to have been relatively benign leading to a restrained 
‘business as usual’ effect. 
The lower level of observed NAS in the year of change to a new auditor following 
Andersen’s demise provides little evidence of either knowledge spillover effects or 
cross-subsidisation of audit fees.  Rather, it is consistent with a client (and audit firm) 
response to concerns over the potential impact of NAS on perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
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The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes 
have resulted in anticompetitive pricing in the UK listed company audit market.  The 
key concern remains the lack of audit firm choice. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1  On 31 May 2005, the US Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision to reverse this 
conviction. 
 
2 The firm also audited Worldcom, another company involved in accounting scandal.  This added 
another blow to Andersen and contributed to its dissolution. 
  
3 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the UK’s independent regulator responsible for promoting 
confidence in corporate reporting and governance. 
 
4 They are intended to: “increase the feasibility of investment in the supply of audit services to public 
interest entities by existing non-Big 4 firms or new firms; reduce the perceived risks to directors of 
selecting a non-Big 4 firm; improve the accountability of boards for their auditor selection decisions; 
improve choice from within the Big 4; reduce the risk of firms leaving the market without good reason; 
and reduce uncertainty and disruption costs in the event of a firm leaving the market.” 
 
5 Peel (1997) includes quoted and unquoted public limited companies and private companies. 
 
6 Another study investigates the frequency of individual changes during the 1990s but not the overall 
level of concentration (Moizer and Porter, 2004). 
 
7 Market power refers to conditions where the providers of a service can consistently charge prices 
above those that would be established by a competitive market. 
 
8 Barriers to entry restrict new entrants to the market at the top end in particular. 
 
9 The OFT (2004, paras 4.16-4.18) reported that the B4 firms have been subject to some of the highest 
cost increases but that professional indemnity insurance remains available to all.   
 
10 Moizer and Porter (2004, pp. 63-65) report that, out of 609 auditor changes, there were 294 (48%) 
auditor resignations, as evidenced by letters filed with the company registrar.  However, the audit 
partners interviewed by them suggested that ‘genuine mid-term resignations are very rare’.  They 
explained that most resignations resulted from the practice of putting audits out to tender; i.e. the 
existing auditor ‘resigns’ when a new auditor is appointed.  Such evidence casts serious doubt on the 
validity of categorising auditor changes based on resignation letters. 
 
11 The available evidence on this, which relates to the US market, is mixed - Johnstone and Bedard 
(2004) and Schloetzer (2006) find evidence that Big N firms retain clients with lower audit risk, while 
Landsman et al. (2008) attribute the adjustments in audit client portfolios to Andersen-induced capacity 
constraints rather that client risk aversion. 
 
12 Investment trusts are generally excluded because a full set of financial data is not available. C4 
(based on audit fees) for investment trusts in 2002 was 0.90 (calculated from Table 3, p.259 of Beattie 
et al. (2003)) in comparison with 0.89 across all sectors. 
 
13 The figure of 85 firms in 1982 is based on the FT 500 only; the figure of 84 in 2003 is a pro forma 
figure. While Pong and Burnett (2006) include AIM companies in their sample (personal 
communication, 7 January 2008), their sample size is somewhat smaller than ours (see Table 2). 
 
14 Until recently, audit fee data was not publicly available in the US. 
 
15 The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would not have affected audit fees until 2004, the year that 
Section 404 became effective (Schloetzer, 2006, p11), and so is not a confounding effect in the analysis 
of audit fee changes in 2002-03. 
 
16 Previously known as the Macmillan Stock Exchange Yearbook.  
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17 This sample Gini coefficient needs to be multiplied by n/(n-1) to obtain unbiased estimators of 
population coefficients. 
 
18 To avoid gross distortion caused by extreme values, the 1% trimmed mean is reported. 
 
19 Concentration based on two more market share measures, auditee total assets and auditee sales, were 
also calculated. As the overall patterns of concentration are similar to those based on audit fees, they 
are not reported here in the interests of brevity. 
 
20 The willingness of firms to drop risky clients is illustrated by Deloitte’s resignation from Easier in 
2004 (Accountancy Age, 2005a) 
 
21 Pong (1999) is the first study to report audit market concentration for the full UK market based on 
audit fees. Although Moizer and Turley (1987) used audit fees, their sample was limited to FTSE500 
companies. 
 
22  These were calculated using data taken from Pong (1999, Table 3, p. 461). 
 
23 The temporary rise in the Gini coefficient to 46 for 2002 reflects the fact that a relatively small 
number of clients continued to be audited by Andersen, giving the firm a small market share and 
leading to a wider inequality of market shares between the 5 top tier auditors.  A broadly similar pattern 
of reduction in top tier inequality by 2003 is indicated in Panel A of Table 4, where the Gini coefficient 
is based on number of audits. However, the smaller Gini coefficients (e.g. 15 for 2003) imply a much 
lower level of inequality between the Big 4; i.e. the number of companies that each firm audits is quite 
similar. 
 
24 The FTSE 100 comprises the 100 largest companies (by market capitalisation) and the FTSE 250 
comprises next largest 250 companies. Together they comprise the largest 350 UK listed companies 
and account for 74% of listed companies’ total audit fees (Beattie et al., 2003). 
 
25 It has been shown that industry specialist auditors reduce earnings management attempts, indicating 
that they provide higher quality audits (e.g. Kwon et al., 2007). 
  
26 An interesting comparison is with the US market pre Andersen’s demise.  Based on 2000-01 audit 
fee data for 63 non-financial industries, Francis et al. (2005: 119) report that industry leaders had, on 
average, 50% of industry fees, with the second ranking firm having 22%. 
 
27 Interestingly, however, in 2005 BDO Stoy Hayward became the first non-top tier firm to audit a 
FTSE 100 company upon the initial public offering of Partygaming (Accountancy Age, 2005b).   
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 Table 1: Concentration in the UK listed company audit market: evidence from prior studies 1972-2007 
 
     No. of audits Audit fees 
Time           Paper Sample Sample size 
No. of active 
audit firms CR4 CR6 CR8 CR20
H 
Index CR4 CR6 CR8 CR20
H 
Index 
1972 Moizer & Turley (1987,1989) FT 500 498 144 0.37        0.44 0.50 4.6 0.47 0.60 0.66 7.1 
1982 Moizer & Turley (1987,1989) FT 500 499 85 0.42          0.54 0.63 6.6 0.54 0.69 0.79 9.4
1984 Briston & Kedslie (1985) Domestic          362 0.38 0.49 0.57 0.76
1987 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1642         216 0.43 0.55 0.64 0.83
1988 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1769         191 0.45 0.57 0.67 0.86
1989 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1871         174 0.45 0.57 0.68 0.88
1990 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1978         167 0.59 0.72 0.79 0.90
1991 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 2070         166 0.59 0.72 0.79 0.90
1991 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1211           0.57 0.70 0.79  0.77 0.89 0.93 15.9
1992 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1222  0.58 0.71 0.79   0.79 0.90 0.94   
1993 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1237  0.59 0.73 0.80   0.80 0.91 0.94   
1994 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1320  0.61 0.74 0.82   0.79 0.92 0.95   
1994/5 Narasimhan & Chung (1998) Domestic 1400  0.61 0.75 0.82  16.7 2      
1994/5 Peel (1997) Inc USM and AIM 3 1865           0.78 
1995 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1401            106 0.60 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.92 0.94 17.0
1997 Pong & Burnett (2006) Inc AIM; exc inv trusts 1280 86 0.61 0.77   11.4 0.81 0.94   17.6 
2001               Pong & Burnett (2006) Inc AIM; exc inv trusts 1094 66 0.64 13.4 0.86 24.8
2002              McMeeking et al. (2007) Sample of non-financial 309 0.80 22.0 0.88 23.0
2002             Beattie et al. (2003) Inc AIM 3 2180 85 0.67 0.86 0.89
2003 4 Beattie et al. (2003) Inc AIM 3 2180            84 0.73 0.89 0.96
2004 Oxera (2006) Selected listed exc AIM 5 676            0.97
2005 Oxera (2006) Selected listed exc AIM 6 865            0.93
2005              McMeeking (2007) FTSE 1007 100 1.00
2005 POB (2006) Main market exc AIM ~1000 8  .83          0
2006 POB (2006) Main market exc AIM ~1000 8  .83          0
2007 POB (2007) Main market exc AIM ~1000 8  .82          0
2007              FRC (2007b) FTSE 350 350 7 0.97
 
Notes:  1. USM was the Unlisted Securities Market; sample includes Irish companies. 
 2. Index calculated for top 8 firms only. 
 3. AIM is the Alternative Investment Market, secondary to the main market. 
 4. Pro forma following Andersen’s collapse, assuming all Andersen clients gained by Deloitte & Touche (the acquirer of Andersen UK). 
 5. Includes only companies with audit fees available from FAME database (approx. 69% of population). 
  6. Includes only those companies where auditor identity available from Datastream (approx. 89% of population, biased towards larger companies). 
 7. A second sample that also included 80 additional listed companies was also considered. 
8. Approximate sample size inferred from Table 23 (pp. 58-61) of POB (2007). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: UK domestic listed companies  
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1998 - 2003  change (%) 
Sample Size 1,607 1,498 1,479 1,539 1,497 1,386  
Number of Auditors 85 80 74 78 77 72  
Retail Price Index  (RPI) 163.4 165.6 171.1 174.4 176.2 181.3 11.0 
RPI Change (%) - +1.4 +3.3 +1.9 +1.0 +2.9  
   
Total Assets (£m)   
Mean 1,519 1,884 2,150 2,230 2,383 2,673 76.0 
Mean Change (%) - +24 +14 +4 +7 +12  
Median 53 58 57 50 45 48 -9.9 
Median Change (%) - +9 -2 -12 -11 +7  
Minimum 0.106 0.045 0.174 0.006 0.003 0.006  
Maximum 219,500 254,800 316,200 358,534 403,100 455,275  
   
Sales (£m)   
Mean 526 580 634 636 657 731 39.0 
Mean Change (%) - +10 +9 0 +3 +11  
Median 52 53 45 40 35 41 -20.4 
Median Change (%) - +1 -14 -12 -11 +17  
Minimum1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Maximum 33,340 37,017 51,503 49,254 60,826 49,039  
   
Audit fees (£000)   
Mean 252 268 268 270 301 339 34.5 
Mean Change (%) - +6 0 +1 +11 +13  
Median 68 70 69 68 71 75 10.3 
Median Change (%) - +3 -1 -1 +4 +6  
Minimum 2 3 2 2 3 1  
Maximum 14,431 14,172 16,926 13,892 15,901 17,920  
   
Audit fees per £000 total assets   
Aggregate2 0.166 0.142 0.125 0.121 0.126 0.127 -23.5 
Mean3 2.05 2.19 1.98 2.53 3.35 3.66 78.5 
Mean Change (%) - +7 -9 +28 +32 +9  
Median 1.38 1.36 1.25 1.38 1.60 1.63 18.4 
Median Change (%) - -2 -8 +10 +16 +2  
Minimum 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008  
Maximum 191 222 46 1,333 1,333 829  
   
Audit fees per £000 sales4   
Aggregate2 0.48 0.461 0.423 0.424 0.458 0.464 -3.3 
Mean3 4.62 5.06 11.45 16.74 20.48 8.29 79.4 
Mean Change (%) - +10 +126 +46 +22 -60  
Median 1.33 1.32 1.54 1.77 1.89 1.80 35.3 
Median Change (%) - 0 +17 +14 +7 -5  
Minimum 0.026 0.034 0.039 0.037 0.029 0.032  
Maximum 2,571 2,333 12,000 10,000 7,000 10,000  
Notes:  1.  Several companies did not report any sales during the year. 
 2.  Aggregate = (sum of all company audit fees)/(sum of all company total assets or sales). 
 3.  To avoid gross distortion by outliers, the 1% trimmed mean (0.5% from top and bottom) is reported. 
  4.  Companies without sales were excluded from analysis. 
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Table 3: Effect of client size on audit fee rate 
 
 
Panel A:  Mean audit fee per £000 total assets  
  Small                              Size decile                                       Large 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2001 10.74 4.40 3.05 2.02 1.87 1.34 1.21 0.81 0.50 0.29 
2002 17.07 4.77 3.48 2.23 2.22 1.67 1.22 0.89 0.54 0.31 
2003 27.42 5.25 3.51 2.54 2.26 1.67 1.28 0.97 0.57 0.33 
2003 vs. 2001 
t-stat1
 
2.91*** 
 
1.98** 
 
1.45 
 
2.96***
 
1.92 
 
2.28**
 
0.64 
 
1.85 
 
1.43 
 
1.37 
     
Panel A:  Median audit fee per £000 total assets 
  Small                              Size decile                                       Large 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2001 6.70 3.51 2.54 1.70 1.50 1.12 0.97 0.62 0.40 0.21 
2002 8.46 4.19 2.79 1.78 1.78 1.23 1.01 0.76 0.40 0.22 
2003 10.31 4.52 2.84 2.14 1.86 1.33 1.10 0.80 0.47 0.25 
2003 vs. 2001 
z-stat1,2
 
5.59*** 
 
2.38** 
 
1.69 
 
2.82***
 
1.57 
 
2.25** 
 
0.73 
 
1.71 
 
1.84 
 
1.87 
    
      1  ** = p< 5%, ***  = p< 1% (2-tail) 
  2   Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test. 
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Table 4: Auditor concentration in the UK domestic listed company market: 1998 
to 2003 
 
 
Panel A:  Based on number of audits 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1998 vs. 2003
z- stat 2 
CR4 67.02 65.69 63.62 61.99 66.40 68.47 0.85 
CR (Big 5/4) 1 75.86 75.30 72.95 70.63 68.80 68.47    -4.51*** 
CR6 80.46 80.57 78.43 76.93 78.96 80.66 0.14 
CR20 94.65 95.79 95.54 95.39 95.12 94.81 0.20 
HI 14.36 13.81 12.78 12.13 12.63 13.32  
Gini (whole market) 87.88 87.50 86.50 86.48 86.12 86.19  
Gini (Big 5/4) 1 29.89 19.25 24.00 23.69 32.00 14.72  
       
Panel B: Based on audit fees 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1998 vs. 2003
z- stat 2
CR4 87.85 87.95 86.44 87.86 93.53 95.94 7.95*** 
CR (Big 5/4) 1 94.94 95.29 94.68 94.66 95.06 95.94 1.30 
CR6 96.00 96.56 96.15 96.16 96.41 97.85 2.89*** 
CR20 99.20 99.31 99.30 99.36 99.44 99.57 1.29 
HI 27.80 26.64 25.28 25.02 25.80 27.04  
Gini (whole market) 96.09 95.88 95.33 95.65 95.95 96.06  
Gini (Big 5/4) 1 47.88 44.17 41.09 42.13 46.00 29.73  
 
                   
Notes: 
1.  Big 5 up to 2002. Most Andersen clients (97 companies) changed auditor in 2002, however, there were 36 
companies’ still audited by Andersen in 2002. These companies were treated as Andersen clients until publication 
of the next annual report in 2003. 
2.  Standard test of difference between proportions;  *** = p< 1% (2-tail). Equivalent tests for HI and Gini 
unavailable. 
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Table 5: Auditor market share (rank) by individual firm 
 
 Market share (rank) based on 
 No. of audits Audit fees 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  1998   1999  2000  2001  2002  2003   
                 %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %
PwC   26.32 (1) 24.97 (1) 22.45 (1) 21.44 (1) 20.57 (1) 20.85 (1) 43.43 (1) 42.71 (1) 40.57 (1) 39.23 (1) 37.72 (1) 40.01 (1) 
KPMG 19.91 19.49(2) (2) 19.41 (2) 18.45 (2) 18.50 (2) 18.47 25.62(2) (2) 23.16 (2) 23.81 (2) 25.18 (2) 26.12 (2) 23.57 (2) 
Deloitte & Touche 9.52 (4) 10.61 (3) 10.62 (4) 11.50 (3) 16.50 (3) 18.33 (3) 7.09 (5) 9.72 (4) 11.39 (3) 13.18 (3) 18.62 (3) 19.53 (3) 
Ernst & Young 11.26 (3) 10.61 (3) 11.16 (3) 10.59 (4) 10.82 (4) 10.82 (4) 11.44 (3) 12.36 (3) 10.67 (4) 10.28 (4) 11.06 (4) 12.83 (4) 
Andersen 8.84 (5) 9.61 (5) 9.33 (5) 8.64 (5) 2.40 (8)    -     - 7.37 (4) 7.34 (5) 8.24 (5) 6.80 (5) 1.53 (5)    -     - 
Total Big 5/4 75.86 75.30 72.95 70.63 68.80 68.47 94.94 95.29 94.68 94.66 95.06 95.94  
        
BDO Stoy Hayward 4.60 (6) 5.27 (6) 5.34 (7) 6.24 (7) 6.08 (6) 5.84 (6) 1.06 (6) 1.28 (6) 1.47 (6) 1.50 (6) 1.35 (6) 1.02 (5) 
Grant Thornton 4.48 (7) 4.61 (7) 5.48 (6) 6.30 (6) 6.48 (5) 6.35 (5) 0.88 (7) 0.88 (7) 1.13 (7) 1.22 (7) 1.12 (7) 0.90 (6) 
Baker Tilly 1.00 (11) 1.13 (11) 1.69 (10) 1.56 (11) 3.61 (7) 4.18 (7) 0.18 (12) 0.18 (11) 0.23 (11) 0.20 (12) 0.49 (8) 0.53 (7) 
Robson Rhodes 1.31 (9) 1.54 (9) 1.49 (11) 1.62 (10) 1.74 (9) 1.80 (9) 0.36 (10) 0.33 (8) 0.34 (8) 0.32 (9) 0.32 (9) 0.26 (8) 
Pannell Kerr Forster 1.49 (8) 1.60 (8) 1.83 (8) 1.88 (8) 1.67 (10) 2.02 (8) 0.36 (9) 0.28 (9) 0.32 (9) 0.33 (8) 0.25 (11) 0.21 (9) 
Moore Stephens 0.75 (13) 0.80 (12) 0.74 (13) 0.78 (13) 1.07 (11) 1.08 (10) 0.37 (8) 0.26 (10) 0.27 (10) 0.23 (11) 0.29 (10) 0.19 (10) 
Others 10.52   9.75  10.48 10.98  10.55 10.25 1.84 1.51 1.56 1.54 1.12 0.96
Total Non-Big 5/4       24.14  24.70  27.05 29.37  31.20 31.53 5.06 4.71 5.32 5.34 4.94 4.06
                          
Total 100            100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total audit fees (£m)              405 401 397 415 450 470 
Number of companies             1,607 1,498 1,479 1,539 1,497 1,386       
 
Note:  Ordered on 2003 audit fee market share. 
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 Table 6:  Analysis of Big 5/4 concentration movement: 1998-2003 
 
Panel A:  Based on number of audits 
  All UK 
Non- Big 5/4  
Number of audits (% of all UK) 
Big 5/4  
Number of audits (% of all UK)
 
Number of audits in 1998  1607  388 (24.1)  1219 (75.9)  
Leavers listed in 1998  (643)  (160) (24.9)  (483) (75.1)  
Continuing companies  964  228 (23.7)  736 (76.3)  
Companies joining LSE 1999-2003 541  262 (48.4)  279 (51.6)   
Leavers who joined after 1998 (119)  (57) (47.9)  (62) (52.1)   
Net joiners  422 205 (48.6)  217 (51.4)  
  1386 433 (31.2)  953 (68.8)  
Non-par switches:       
Auditor change to Big 5/4 1999-2003   (99)   99   
Auditor change from Big 5/4 1999-2003    103   (103)   
  _____  4   (4)   
Number of audits in 2003  1386  
 45
437 (31.5)  949 (68.5)  
        
Panel B:  Based on audit fees (£000) 
 All UK 
Non- Big 5/4 
Total audit fee (% of all UK) 
Big 5/4 
Total audit fee (% of all UK) 
 
Audit fees  in 1998   405,211   20,514 (5.1)   384,697 (94.9)  
Leavers listed in 1998  (116,897)   (10,154) (8.7)   (106,743) (91.3)  
Continuing companies’ audit fees at 1998    288,314   10,360 (3.6)   277,654 (96.3)  
Continuing companies’ audit fee changes   134,821     7,158 (5.3)   127,663 (94.7)  
Continuing companies’ audit fees at 2003   423,135   17,518 (4.1)   405,317 (95.8)  
Companies joining LSE 1999-2003 55,030   6,319 (11.5)   48,711   (88.5)   
Leavers who joined after 1998 (8,015)   (1,957) (24.4)   (6,058)   (75.6)   
Net joiners     47,015     4,362 (9.3)   42,653 (90.7)  
   470,150   21,880 (4.7)   447,970 (95.3)  
Non-par switches:           
Auditor change to Big 5/4 1999-2003     (9,357)    9,357    
Auditor change from Big 5 /4 1999-2003    6,532    (6,532)    
       (2,825)   2,825   
Audit fees  in 2003   470,150   19,055 (4.1)  451,095 (95.9)  
 
Notes: 1.  The number (£000) of auditor changes to Big 5/4 is as follows: 1999 = 26 (2,423); 2000 =22 (1,409); 2001=18 (1,934); 2002= 21 (1,795); 2003=12 (1,796). 
           2.  The number (£000) of auditor changes from Big 5/4 is as follows: 1999 = 17 (906); 2000 =9 (1,149); 2001=23 (1,128); 2002= 33 (1,603); 2003=21 (1,746). 
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Table 7: Auditor market share in 2003 (based on audit fees) by industry sector 
 
Sector Mkt Cap 
(£bn) 
No. of 
Cos 
PwC 
% 
KPMG
% 
DT 
% 
EY 
% 
Big 4
% 
BDO
% 
GT
% 
BT 
% 
RR 
% 
PKF 
% 
MS
% 
Top-10
% 
Others
% 
Resources                
Mining 57,258 31 19.4 30.1 36.4 11.9 97.7 0.0 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 99.8 0.2 
Oil & Gas 243,152 31 92.0 0.1 1.6 5.0 98.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 99.7 0.3 
Basic Industries                
Chemicals 19,110 20 42.6 50.6 4.4 0.8 98.4 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 99.3 0.7 
Cons. & Build. Mat. 37,924 71 32.5 31.4 16.2 15.2 95.2 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.5 97.7 2.3 
Forestry & Paper 1,563 3 4.9 95.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Steel & Oth. Metals 3,158 4 94.6 1.4 3.6 0.0 99.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 0.4 
General Industrials                
Aerospace & Defence 71,062 13 34.8 53.0 9.6 2.1 99.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 0.4 
Diversified Industrials 197,192 4 15.3 78.8 0.0 0.0 94.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.1 5.9 
Elect. & Elect’l Equip. 13,478 46 5.1 10.6 19.1 53.6 88.4 1.1 7.3 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0 98.2 1.8 
Engin. & Machinery 32,952 64 18.0 37.3 25.4 15.2 95.8 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 98.5 1.5 
Cyclical                 
Automobiles 41,041 20 77.3 10.6 4.7 2.5 95.1 1.3 3.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Housing Gds & Textiles 4,297 52 54.1 18.4 10.3 4.4 87.2 0.2 2.7 1.1 1.6 0.4 0.0 93.1 6.9 
Non-Cyclical                 
Beverages 64,621 9 27.3 60.9 0.0 10.4 98.7 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.1 
Food Prod. & Process. 43,481 30 57.1 17.2 21.6 2.7 98.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 99.6 0.4 
Health 34,224 41 45.0 18.5 27.0 4.1 94.6 0.0 1.0 1.3 2.2 0.2 0.0 99.2 0.8 
Person. Care & House.  15,526 3 0.0 14.0 81.9 0.0 95.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.9 4.1 
Pharma. & Biotech. 187,309 38 62.6 28.8 5.7 0.5 97.5 0.6 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Tobacco 94,614 3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Cyclical Services                
General Retailers 63,140 68 49.0 13.3 22.0 6.3 90.6 7.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 99.3 0.7 
Leisure & Hotels 30,927 88 20.3 20.9 15.6 32.0 88.8 4.9 1.6 2.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 98.1 1.9 
Media & Entertainment 62,865 99 35.7 6.1 41.3 11.7 94.8 0.7 1.1 2.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 99.3 0.7 
Support Services 38,866 149 36.2 25.6 17.1 16.7 95.6 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 99.1 0.9 
Transport 27,054 38 31.9 22.1 15.0 30.5 99.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 0.2 
Non-Cyclical Services                
Food & Drug Retailers 33,453 16 66.3 17.6 0.0 12.0 95.9 2.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 0.8 
Telecom. Services 163,225 19 24.2 39.3 35.2 0.8 99.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 99.7 0.3 
Utilities                
Electricity 14,995 6 55.8 37.3 0.0 5.3 98.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Utilities - Other 31,251 10 86.8 0.8 5.8 5.8 99.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 0.8 
Financials                
Banks 377,346 10 42.6 24.3 33.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Insurance 35,593 21 63.7 14.0 6.8 8.8 93.3 0.0 1.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 96.5 3.5 
Life Assurance 38,290 8 10.3 50.8 2.4 36.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Real Estate 26,178 76 23.7 24.7 37.4 2.9 88.8 3.4 1.4 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 95.9 4.1 
Speciality & Oth. Fin 54,951 125 28.1 11.5 24.7 29.0 93.2 1.5 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.1 97.8 2.2 
Info. Technology                
IT Hardware 6,210 28 13.7 6.6 18.5 53.4 92.2 1.6 0.3 2.5 1.6 0.9 0.5 99.5 0.5 
Soft. & Comp. Services 71,410 142 31.2 20.4 25.4 11.9 88.8 3.3 3.0 2.2 0.8 0.3 0.4 98.9 1.1 
Summary                
No. of sectors where:  
 market share ≥ 50% 
   
11 
 
6 
 
1 
 
2 
 
20 
        
 market leader   18 8 4 4 34         
 ≥ 50% & market leader   11 6 1 2 20         
Total cos. in 34 sectors  1,386              
Notes: 1.  Market shares of 50% or greater are highlighted in bold; leaders are underlined.  
   2.  PwC= PricewaterhouseCoopers; KPMG= KPMG; DT= Deloitte; EY= Ernst & Young; BDO= BDO Stoy Hayward; 
       GT= Grant Thornton; BT= Baker Tilly; RR= Robson Rhodes; PKF= PKF; MS= Moore Stephens. 
 
 Table 8: Analysis of former Andersen clients - successor auditors, audit and NAS fees  
 
 
Median Median Median
DT 2 93 74.4 19,471 20,449 5.0 0.93 1.04 7.2% 49,355 39,300 -20.4 68,826 59,749 -13.2
PWC 9 7.2 2,711 2,535 -6.5 1.08 1.34 -9.3 1,418 2,103 48.3 4,129 4,638 12.3
EY 6 4.8 3,818 4,264 11.7 0.87 0.86 6.3% 3,200 973 -69.6 7,018 5,237 -25.4
KPMG 6 4.8 1,211 1,062 -12.3 1.18 0.73 -23.9 2,063 2,544 23.3 3,274 3,606 10.1
B4 excl DT 21 16.8 7,740 7,861 1.6 0.99 0.94 -6.7 6,681 5,620 -15.9 14,421 13,481 -6.5
0.0 0.0 1.2
All B4 114 91.2 27,211 28,310 4.0 0.95 0.99 3.0 56,036 44,920 -19.8 83,247 73,230 -12.0
0.0 -15.1 -1.9
All non-B4 11 8.8 366 322 -12.0 2.31 2.35 1.7 399 211 -47.1 765 533 -30.3
-10.0 0.0 -28.4
All former AA clients 125 100 27,577 28,632 3.8 1.00 1.02 2.4 56,435 45,131 -20.0 84,012 73,763 -12.2
0.0 -13.2 -3.9
Notes:
1.  AA= Andersen; DT= Deloitte Touche; PWC= PricewaterhouseCoopers; EY= Ernst & Young; KPMG= KPMG; 
     non-B4 successor auditors are BDO Stoy Hayward (4); Robson Rhodes (3); Nexia Audit (2); Grant Thornton (1); and Wilkins Kennedy (1).
2.  For DT, the median change in audit fees, NAS and total fees were 0.0%, -17.1% and -6.6% respectively.
3.  This is the median across the 21, 114, 11, 125 former AA clients audited respectively by 'B4 excluding DT', B4, non-B4 and overall.
4.  This is the median % change in audit fee rate across the group of new auditor clients rather than the change in median audit fee rate.
Median change in fees 
across non-B4  3
Median change in fees 
across all AA clients 3
Median change in fees 
across B4  3
Panel A
Median change in fees 
across B4 excl DT  3
 % Change
Panel B Panel D Panel E
Aggregate AUDIT fees (£000)
Successor 1 No. of audits % AA New auditor  % Change New auditor % Change 4  % Change
Audit fees per £000 total assets
Panel C
Aggregate TOTAL fees (£000)Aggregate NAS fees (£000)
AA New auditorAA AA New auditor
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Figure 1: Effects of client size on audit fee rate 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Size Deciles (based on total assets-in ascending order)
M
ed
ia
n 
au
di
t f
ee
 r
at
e
2001
2002
2003
 
 
 
Note: 1. Audit fee rate = £audit fee per £000 total assets audited 
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